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IMPEACHMENT-A MACE FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
Representative Gerald R. Ford*
Whenever, as seldom happened, an individual Member became turbu-
lent and seemed beyond the Speaker's control, the Sergeant at Arms, on order
of the Speaker, lifted the mace from its pedestal and "'presented" it before
the offending person. Order was promptly restored, so great was the respect
for the mace as a symbol of legislative authority. Thus the Members of the
House, who are themselves lawmakers, very properly set an example for the
whole country of respect for discipline. THE MACE OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 9 (7th ed. 1969).
Article I of the United States Constitution establishes the Congressional
power of impeachment for removing a federal official from office. The House of
Representatives is given "the sole Power of Impeachment '" and consequently
serves as grand jury and prosecutor. The Senate acts as judge and petit jury:
"The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments .... And no
Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members
present.
'" 2
One must continually remember that the writers of the Constitution did their
work with the experience of the British Crown and Parliament freshly in mind.
There is so much that resembles the British system in the Constitution that the
even sharper differences are sometimes overlooked--one of the sharpest is the
divergent view of impeachment.
In Great Britain an impeachment is initiated by motion in the House of
Commons' and tried in the House of Lords.4 Under the English system of im-
peachment the Lords can try, convict and punish any impeached subject (private
person or official) with any lawful penalty for his crime--including death.5 The
United States Constitution, on the contrary, provides only the relatively mild
penalties of removal from office and disqualification for future federal office. The
worst punishment the United States Senate can mete out is both removal and
disqualification:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of
honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and
Punishment, according to Law.0
In other words, impeachment resembles a regular criminal indictment and
trial but it is not the same thing. It is a proceeding of an entirely political nature
* Minority Leader of the United States House of Representatives; Representative from the
Fifth District of Michigan since 1949; B.A., University of Michigan, 1935; LL.B., Yale Univer-
sity, 1941.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2: "The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and
other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment."
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
3 Blair's Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 1207 (1689).
4 Middlesex's Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1183 (1624).
5 See e.g., Dernwentwater's Case, 15 How. St. Tr. 761 (1716).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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and relates solely to the accused's right to hold civil office, not to the many other
rights which are his as a citizen and which protect him in a court of law.' By
pointedly voiding any immunity an accused might claim under the double
jeopardy principle, the framers of the Constitution clearly established that im-
peachment is a unique political device; designed explicitly to dislodge from public
office those who are patently unfit for it but cannot otherwise be promptly
removed. Furthermore, impeachment is made the sole exception to the constitu-
tional guarantee that trial of all crimes shall be by jury-perhaps the most funda-
mental of all constitutional protections.
The Congressional power of impeachment is one of the most difficult of the
political mechanisms provided by the Constitution. It is rarely resorted to-a
majority of the House of Representatives has voted to impeach only twelve times
in 184 years.9 Even more rare is a successful impeachment. In only four of the
twelve cases has the Senate, by the required two-thirds vote, convicted and re-
moved the accused official from office." Seven federal officials escaped conviction
and removal 1 while in one case the accused resigned during trial, halting further
proceedings against him. 2
The difficulty of the impeachment process is in part deliberate, as the debates
of the Constitutional Convention clearly show, but it is also partly the result of our
political development which has not always gone the way the founding fathers
7 As James Bayard, chairman .of the House managers (once the House of Representatives
decides to impeach an official it appoints "managers" to argue the case for the House before
the Senate) during the first impeachment proceeding against a federal official, said:
[I]mpeachment is a proceeding of a purely political nature. It is not so much
designed to punish the offender, as to secure the State. It touches neither his person
nor his property, but simply divests him of his political capacity. F. WHARTON, STATE
TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES 263 (1849).
8 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury .... "
9 A majority of the House of Representatives has voted to impeach in the following
instances: (1) William Blount, United'States Senator (1797). See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 459
(1797). (2) John Pickering, Judge of the United States District Court for New Hampshire
(1803). See 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 642 (1803). (3) Samuel Chase, Justice of the United
States Supreme Court (1804). See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 1180 (1804). (4) James Peck,
United States Judge for the District of Missouri (1830). See 6 CONG. DE. 819 (1830). (5)
West Humphries, United States Judge for the several districts of Tennessee (1862). See CONG.
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1966 (1862). (6) Andrew Johnson, President of the United
States (1868). See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1400 (1868). (7) William Belknap,
United States Secretary of War (1876). See 4 CONG.-REC. 1433 (1876). (8) Charles Swayne,
United States Judge for the Northern District of Florida (1904). See 39 CONG. RE. 249
(1904). (9) Robert Archbald, United States Circuit Judge for the Commerce Court (1912). See
48 CONG. REc. 8934 (1912). (10) George English, United States Judge for the Eastern District
of Illinois (1926). See 67 CONG. Rac. 6736 (1926). (11) Harold Louderback, United States
Judge for the Northern District of California (1933). See 76 CONO. REc. 4925 (1933). (12)
Haisted Ritter, United States Judge for the Southern District of Florida (1936). See 80 CONG.
Rac. 3092 (1936).
10 (1) Judge John Pickering (1804). See 13 ANNALS OF CONG.. 367 (1804). (2) Judge
West Humphries (1862). See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2953 (1862). (3) Judge
Robert Archbald (1913). See 49 CONG. REC. 1448 (1913). (4) Judge Halsted Ritter'(1936).
See 80 CONG. REc. 5607 (1936).
11 (1) Senator William Blount (1799). See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2319 (1799). (2) Justice
Samuel Chase (1805). See 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 669 (1805). (3) Judge James Peck (1831).
See 7 CONG. DEB. 45 (1831). (4) President Andrew Johnson (1868). See CONG. GLOBE
(Supplement-TRiAL OF THE PRESmENT), 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 415 (1868). (5) Secretary of
War William Belknap (1876). See 4 CONG. REc. 357 (1876) (TRIAL OF WILLIAm BELKNAP).
(6) Judge Charles Swayne (1905). See 39 CONG. R Ec. 3472 1905). (7) Judge Harold
Louderback (1933). See 77 CONG. RIc. 4088 (1933).
12 Judge George English (1926). See 68 CONG. REc. 303 (1926).
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anticipated., The framers of the Constitution were primarily interested in im-
peachment" as an extraordinary way of removing a President. Experience under
the Articles of Confederation proved the need for a strong executive, and the
framers responded by creating one.13 Nonetheless, protection from the arbitrary
abuse of executive power such as had been experienced under the King and the
King's agents was present in their minds. Consequently, the last recourse against
presidential abuse-removal by impeachment without waiting for he expiration
of the President's four-year term-was given to Congress.
As it turned out, however, all but three of the twelve impeachment proceed-
ings and all four of the successful ones have involved federal judges." The reason
is obvious. Abuse of power actually developed not so much in the executive
branch as the framers feared. The checks and balances they established in
Congress and'the courts combined with the political restraints of regular elections
to prevent executive excesses. Rather, abuse of power developed most often in the
judicial branch, where impeachment offers the only constitutional remedy.
It is irrelevant, therefore, to dwell on the difficulty of' impeachment. The
cumbersome constitutional mechanism serves a most commendable purpose in
safeguarding the independence of the federal judiciary as the framers intended.
Difficult, cumbersome, archaic as it may be, impeachment is the sole check and
balance in our system to prevent judicial independence from degenerating into
judicial tyranny or judicial caprice.
The rarity and the difficulty of impeachment, however, do contribute 'to
much public misunderstanding. The literature of impeachment is limited aid
the precedents are few, not fully documented and susceptible to conflicting
interpretations. In this generation there is a definite scarcity of experts on the
subject since the most recent impeachment trial took place in' 1936. Not a single
incumbent Senator and only five members of the present- House of Representatives
held office when United States District Judge Halsted L. Ritter of Florida was
impeached and removed from office thirty-five years ago.' 5 Nevertheless, develop-
ments in recent years have revived interest in the subject and led to a great deal
of misunderstanding. The purpose of this article is to examine the nature of the
impeachment process itself and to discus&i four major misconceptions which have
arisen to cloud the issue.
The first and most serious misconieption is that of regarding impeachment
as primarily a judicial process. It is not that at all; it is a political device, a
unique part of our political system under the Constitution. That part of the cori-
fusion which is not deliberately promoted may be due to a failure to make the
necessary distinction between "political" in its precise meaning and "partisan,"
which is a'different matter. Both in principle and in practice the impeachment
process shobld not be and usually has not been unduly partisan, but it has always
been political.
13 See U.S. CONST. art. II.
14 See notes 9 & 10 supra. A discussion of the impeachment proceedings brought-against
federal judges can be found in Kelley & Wylie, The Congressional Impeachment Power 'as It
Relates to the Federal Judiciary, 46 No'rse DAME LAWYER 678 (1971).
15 The five members of the House of Representatives are: Leslie Arends (R-Ill.),
Emanuel Celler (D.-N.Y.), William Colmer (D.-Miss.), George Mahon (D.-Tex.), Wright
Patman (D.-Tex.).
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There are a number of ways of gaining civil office in any government. One
may be born to it, appointed to it, elected to it, or nominated and confirmed in it.
One also may seize it by brute force. In the United States the hereditary route
has been outlawed and the coup d'etat has been outgrown. The other ways of
gaining civil office are political.
Conversely, there are many ways of losing civil office: death, natural or
otherwise; resignation or retirement; forcible eviction by illegal means; and sum-
mary or administrative discharge by legal process. There are also political ways,
the most common of which is failure to be reappointed or reelected at the end of
a fixed term. In addition, each body in the Congress can disqualify and even
expel its members whether duly elected or not. 6 This is a political removal.
Recall is another political method, though not present in the federal system.
Finally, among the political processes for removing unfit officials is impeachment.
Impeachment inevitably must be a political rather than a judicial process
since in the end it is resolved, without appeal or any necessity of explanation, by
constitutional majorities of the House and Senate. The requirement of a two-
thirds vote in the Senate to convict has, in practice, kept this use of political
power from becoming a purely partisan exercise. Even in the supercharged
partisanship of the Jeffersonian takeover from the Federalists, and the post-Civil
War reprisals against Lincoln's moderate successor, impeachment efforts failed to
muster pure party-line support. This is to be applauded, but to condemn any
effort to employ the constitutional process of impeachment as "politics" is to
misconstrue the legitimate right of the people, through their elected representa-
tives, to rid the federal judiciary of judges who have brought it into discredit and
disrepute. Since impeachment is the only legal remedy, what other recourse do
the Sunday morning critics recommend?
Even though it has been employed on the average of only once every fifteen
years, and usually in the more turbulent periods of our history, the constitutional
power of impeachment stands, like the historic Mace in the House of Representa-
tives, as a constant warning of potential punishment if power and immunity are
too flagrantly abused.
The second widespread misconception is that federal judges and the Justices
of the Supreme Court are appointed for life. The founding fathers would have
been the last to make the mistake of giving life terms to such officials since the
American Revolution had been waged against a hereditary system. The King
always had a life term and, as English history bloodily demonstrated, he could be
removed from office only by the headsman's axe or the assassin's dagger. The
Constitution does not guarantee a lifetime of power and authority to any public
official. The terms of members of the House are fixed at two years;1" of the
President and Vice President at four; 8 of United States Senators at six. 9 Mem-
bers of the federal judiciary hold their offices only "during good behaviour."
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5: "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a
Member."
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
18 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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The first section of article III of the Constitution states in full:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office. (Emphasis added.)
It suggests further that the income of jurists was, even then, a highly sensitive
matter and that the salaries of federal judges should be adequate to their needs.
The 91st Congress agreed to a Presidential recommendation raising the salaries of
United States District Judges to $40,000 per annum, of Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court to $60,000 and of the Chief Justice to $62,500.
The Constitution is perfectly clear about the tenure, or term of office of all
federal judges-it is "during good behaviour.""0 It is implicit in this that when
behavior ceases to be good, the right to hold judicial office ceases also. Thus, one
comes quickly to the central question: What constitutes "good behaviour" or,
conversely, bad or disqualifying behavior?
The words employed by the framers of the Constitution were, as the pro-
ceedings of the convention detail, chosen with exceedingly great care and pre-
cision. Note the word "behaviour." It relates to action-not merely to thoughts
or opinions. It refers to a pattern or continuing sequence of action-not to a
single act. A federal judge cannot and should not be removed for the legal views
he holds-this would be as contemptible as excluding him from serving on the
Supreme Court for his ideology or past decisions. Nor should he be removed for
a minor or isolated mistake-this does not constitute "behavior" in the common
meaning. What should be scrutinized in judges is their continuing pattern of
action-their behavior. The Constitution does not demand that it be exemplary
or perfect, but it does have to be "good."
Naturally, there must be an orderly procedure for determining whether or
not a federal judge's behavior is good. The courts, arbiters in most such questions
of judgment, cannot judge themselves. The founding fathers, therefore, vested
this ultimate power where the ultimate sovereignty of our system is most directly
reflected-in the Congress, in the elected representatives of the people and of
the states.
Article II of the Constitution, dealing with the executive branch, states in
section 4: "The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction -of,
Treason, Bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors." This has been the
most controversial of the Constitutional references to the impeachment process.
No consensus exists as to whether, in the case of federal judges, impeachment
must depend upon conviction of one of the two specified crimes of treason or
bribery or be within the nebulous category of "other high crimes and mis-
20 The clause in article III dealing with the compensation of federal judges bolsters the
fact that their "Continuance in office" was not unlimited. If the framers had intended un-
limited tenure, it would have been much simpler to have said "during their lifetimes."
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demeanors," even though the point 'has been well argued in past impeachment
proceedings.2
It is this author's view that conviction of one or more of the offenses cited
in article II is required for removal of the indirectly-elected President and Vice
President or of appointed civil officers of the executive branch of the federal
government, whatever their terms of office. In the case of members of the judicial
branch, federal judges and justices, however, an additional and much stricter
requirement is imposed by article III-namely, "good behaviour." This view has
substantial support in the history of past impeachment proceedings.22
, The third common misconception about impeachment is that federal judges
can be impeached and removed only by being convicted of violating the law at a
proceeding with all the ordinary protections and presumptions of innocence to
which an accused is entitled. A study of the principal impeachment actions that
have been initiated over the years reveals that there are too few cases to make
very good law. About the only thing most authorities can agree upon in recent
history is that an offense need not be indictable to be impeachable.2 In other
words, something less than a criminal act or criminal dereliction of duty may
nevertheless be sufficient grounds for impeachment and removal from public
office.
It is fair, however, to come to one conclusion from our history of impeach-
ment: a higher standard is expected of federal judges than of any other "civil
Officers" of the United States. The President and Vice President, and all persons
holding office at the pleasure of the President, can be thrown out of office by the
voters at least every four years. To remove them in midterm might indeed require
crimes of the magnitude of treason and bribery. Other elected officials, such as
members of Congress, are so vulnerable to public displeasure that their removal
by the complicated impeachment route has not even been tried since 1798.2 But
nine federal judges, including one Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, have
been impeached by the House and tried by the Senate;25 four were acquitted,26
four were convicted," and one resigned.2" Certainly this is not a record of con-
gressional power misused.
In the most recent impeachment trial conducted by the Senate, that of
21 See generally SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON H. REs. 920 OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
91st CONG., 2d SEss., LEGAL.. MATERIALS ON IMPEACHMENT (Comm. Print 1970).
22 See generally Kelley & Wyllie, The Congressional Impeachment Power as It Relates to
the Federal Judiciary, 46 NoTa DAME LAWYER 678 (1971).
23 See e.g., 0. PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 204-05 (2d ed. 1968); H.
ROTTSCHAEFER, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 412 (1939); Burton, An
Independent judiciary: The Keystone of Our Freedom, 39 A.B.A.J. 1067, 1068 (1953). ,
This issue, however, was hotly contested until President Andrew Johnson's impeachment
and during the proceedings against Judge Swayne. See generally 3 A. HiNDS, PRECEDENTS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES §§ 2008-21 (1907).
. 24 William Blount was expelled by the Senate before the House of Representatives im-
peached him. Blount then successfully asserted that the Senate no longer had jurisdiction over
him. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2319 (1799). Blount's case stands as a precedent for the propo-
sition that Senators are not subject to impeachment, although to be precise, it immunized only
ex-Senators or expelled Senators.
25 See note 9 supra.
'26 See note 11 supra.
27 See note 10 supra.
28 See note 12 supra.
[Summer, 1971]
[Vol. 46:669] IMPEACHMENT-A MACE FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 675
United States District Judge Halsted L. Ritter of the Southern District of
Florida in 1936, the point of judicial behavior was paramount, since the criminal
charges were admittedly thin. This case was in the context of FDR's effort to
pack the Supreme Court with justices more to his liking; Judge Ritter was a trans-
planted Colorado Republican appointed to the federal bench in solidly Dem-
ocratic Florida by President Coolidge. He was convicted by a coalition of liberal
Republicans, New Deal Democrats and Farmer-Labor and Progressive Party
Senators in what might be called the "Northwestern Strategy" of that era. The
arguments of the Senators were persuasive.
In a joint statement, Senators Borah, La Follette, Frazier and Shipstead
said:
We therefore did not, in passing upon the facts presented to us in the
matter of the impeachment proceedings against Judge Halsted L. Ritter, seek
to satisfy ourselves as to whether technically a crime or crimes had been
committed, or as to whether the acts charged and proved disclosed criminal
intent or corrupt motive; we sought, only to ascertain from these facts
whether his conduct had been such as to amount to misbehavior, misconduct
-as to whether he had conducted himself in a way that was calculated to
undermine public confidence in the courts and to create a sense of scandal.
There are a great many things which one must readily admit would be
wholly unbecoming, wholly intolerable, in the conduct of a judge, and yet
these things might not amount to a crime.
2 9
Senator Elbert Thomas of Utah, citing the Jeffersonian and colonial
antecedents of the impeachment process, bluntly declared:
Tenure during good behavior.., is in no sense a guaranty of a life job, and
misbehavior in the ordinary, dictionary sense of the term will cause it to be
cut short on the vote, under special oath, of two-thirds of the Senate, if
charges are first brought by the House of Representatives .... To assume
that good behavior means anything but good behavior would be to cast a
reflection upon the ability of the fathers to express themselves in under-
standable language.30
The best summary, however, was that of Senator William G. McAdoo of
California, son-in-law of Woodrow Wilson and his Secretary of the Treasury:'
I approach this subject from the standpoint of the general conduct of
this judge while on the bench, as portrayed by the various counts in the
impeachment and the evidence submitted in the trial. The picture thus
presented is, to my mind, that of a man who is so lacking in any proper
conception of professional ethics and those high standards of judicial char-
acter and conduct as-to constitute misbehavior in its most serious aspects,
and to render him unfit to hold a judicial office.
Good behavior, as it is used in the Constitution, exacts of a judge the
29 80 CoNo. Rn. 5657 (1936) (statement of Senators Borah, La Follette, Frazier and
Shipstead in the matter of the impeachment of Halsted L. Ritter).
30 Id. at 5657-58 (memorandum opinion in the impeachment trial of Judge Halsted L.
Ritter submitted by Senator Elbert D. Thomas).
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highest standards of public and private rectitude. No judge can besmirch
the robes he wears by relaxing these standards, by compromising them
through conduct which brings reproach upon himself personally, or upon the
great office he holds. No more sacred trust is committed to the bench of
the United States than to keep shining with undimmed effulgence the
brightest jewel in the crown of democracy-justice.
However disagreeable the duty may be to those of us who constitute
this great body in determining the guilt of those who are entrusted under
the Constitution with the high responsibilities of judicial office, we must be
as exacting in our conception of the obligations of a judicial officer as Mr.
Justice Cardozo defined them when he said, in connection with fiduciaries,
that they should be held "to something stricter than the morals of the market-
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior. (Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458.) "31
(Emphasis added.)
The fourth and final misconception is that the impeachment process, or even
the prospect of its use by Congress, is somehow destructive of the cherished con-
stitutional principle of separation of powers. 2 How one constitutional concept
can be subversive of another defies logic, but this is frequently parroted. Far
from being a threat to the tripartite system of federal government, impeachment
is an integral part of it. The separation of powers is not and never was a water-
tight compartmentation of executive, legislative and judicial powers and duties,
but rather a delicate mixture and balance among them.
The separate character of the three co-equal branches becomes fuzzed up
even in the pristine text of the Constitution, and even more so in practice. This
is because the founding fathers were practical politicians who resolved hard
dilemmas precisely the way practical politicians do today. A certain amount of
fuzzing up of pure theory inevitably ensues. For instance, the Chief Executive
exercises legislative power when he vetoes and judicial power when he pardons.
The Congress wields executive power when the House impeaches and judicial
power when the Senate tries an impeachment. The judiciary is the only branch
not constitutionally empowered to encroach upon the executive and legislative
domain, yet it has successfully asserted a veto against the acts of both. And who
will deny that today's Supreme Court legislates as well as adjudicates in its
momentous decisions?
33
The plain truth is that tripartite separation of powers never was neat or
absolute. It has always been untidy and pragmatic. The abuse of political power
in all three branches is a continuing threat; its prevention relies upon a delicate
division of powers with the scales shifting in every generation, only to be righted
by the counterforce of centending powers.
Under the Constitution and the ever-widening franchise the abuse of execu-
tive and legislative powers can be corrected in two or four or six years at the
worst. But judicial misbehavior can be reached by the body politic through
one method and one method only-impeachment.
31 Id. at 5756-58 (memorandum opinion of Senator McAdoo in the matter of the impeach-
ment of Halsted L. Ritter).
32 See e.g., Letter from Simon H. Rifkind to Emanuel Celler, Aug. 18, 1970, in 103 CONG.
REc. 8687-89 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1970).
33 See e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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That the independence of the federal judiciary depends upon an extra-
ordinary degree of job security is unarguable. But to jump from this to the
proposition that once elevated to the bench, federal judges henceforth and forever
wear their robes by some Divine Right and bear no responsibility to the corn-
one method and one method only-impeachment.
It has been alleged that use of the impeachment process in today's contro-
versial political climate threatens the integrity of the judiciary and the United
States Supreme Court in particular."a It can be argued with greater force that
the removal of unfit judges can only enhance the esteem and confidence in which
the high court is held. In any event, the Constitution makes Congress the Mace
of the federal judiciary-not Congress acting concurrently as it does in legislating,
but the House and Senate in separate and unusual roles. Neither body can
effectively touch any judge without the other. Surely this is a far cry from the
bugaboo of "judges serving at the pleasure of Congress."
What is central to the entire question of impeachment is neither the
privileges and powers of the judicial branch nor the privileges and powers of
the legislative branch but the primary interest of the public. Confidence in gov-
ernment is the touchstone of a free society. If the duty of the courts is to protect
citizens from bad laws, it is equally the duty of the Congress to protect them from
bad judges.
34 See e.g., Letter from Simon H. Rifkind to Emanuel Celler, Aug. 18, 1970, in 103 CONG.
Rac. 8687-89 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1970).
